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Torts and the Protection of “Legally Recognized Interests” 
Sandra A. Hoffmann and W. Michael Hanemann 
Abstract 
The law of torts plays an important role in completing the legal property rights system by 
defining the extent to which property is protected from harm. It does this by defining the kinds of 
interests that will be recognized and protected from harm by the courts, the duty of care owed 
these recognized interests by others, and the manner in which they will be protected through 
monetary compensation, restitution, or injunction. Together, these three elements of torts define 
a right in the “bundle of rights” that constitute property. In this paper, we develop a systematic 
approach to formalizing the nature of the property rights protected by tort law. We use this 
approach to reexamine the literature on compensation for nonpecuniary damages. This 
reexamination demonstrates how recognizing tort’s role in defining property rights and having a 
way of formalizing these rights can provide deeper insight into old questions torts scholarship.                             
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Torts and the Protection of “Legally Recognized Interests” 
Sandra A. Hoffmann and W. Michael Hanemann∗ 
Introduction 
Richard Posner observed many years ago that the law of tort is primarily about protecting 
property rights (Posner 1977, 31). When Calabresi and Malamed wrote their groundbreaking 
paper on the efficiency implications of alternative means of protecting entitlements, they noted 
that the relationship between torts and property had been long neglected and that the questions 
they were examining were but one perspective on this relationship (Calabresi and Melamed 
1972). This relationship is no longer neglected in the law and economics literature. A large, 
ongoing body of research has examined the question of when property rights are more efficiently 
protected by property rules or injunction and when they are more efficiently protected by liability 
rules (see, e.g., Ellickson 1973; Polinsky 1979; Rose-Ackerman 1985; Kaplow and Shavell 1996; 
Krier and Schwab 1997; Ayres and Goldbart 2003). This paper provides a different perspective 
on the relationship between the law of tort and property than has typically been taken in the law 
and economics literature.  
In a society with constant social and physical interaction among individuals, a property 
rights system would be incomplete unless it defined the limits of permissible unintentional 
interference with property interests, and unless it provided a system of enforcement that gives 
meaning to those limits. Thus, one of the incidences of ownership must be the right to use 
property free from legally wrongful interference or harm by others (Keeton et al. 1988). If 
property can be defined as a bundle of rights (Honoré 1961; Penner 1996), then torts can 
properly be seen as defining and protecting specific sticks in that bundle. The role of torts in 
defining and enforcing property rights fulfills an important economic function that has not been 
fully explored in the law and economics literature. Tort law provides a reasonably objective and 
observable set of community standards (legal norms) that help settle expectations in the face of 
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uncertainty. In the world envisioned by Arrow’s and Debreu’s models of exchange economies 
with uncertainty, tort law helps promote exchange by reducing added uncertainty about the 
security of initial endowments (Arrow 1952; Debreu 1959). It gives real, institutional meaning to 
what economic actors possess when they have an initial endowment.  
In this paper we examine how one might systematically model the incidences of property 
created and enforced by tort law and analyze their effect on economic behavior. We then show 
how such a model can help provide deeper insights into the law and economics analysis of tort, 
using as an example the search for a unified approach to assessing compensation for 
nonpecuniary and pecuniary loss. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, we present a 
legal analysis of the entitlement conferred by tort law. This is then formalized in Section 2 in an 
economic model of the incidences of ownership defined and enforced by tort law. In Section 3 
we show how this perspective on tort law can add to our understanding of the design and 
function of torts by reexamining the literature on insurance and tort compensation for 
nonpecuniary loss. We conclude in Section 4 with a summary of how tort law functions to create 
and protect rights in the bundle of rights that makes up property. 
1 The Entitlement Conferred by Torts 
The nature of the entitlement created and enforced by torts is complex. At a general level, 
torts has been seen as a “body of law which is directed toward the compensation of individuals 
[or other legal persons]…for losses which they have suffered within the scope of their legally 
recognized interests…where law considers that compensation is required (Keeton et al. 1984, 5–
6). The Restatement of Torts Second refers to a basic purpose of torts as being to provide 
compensation for legally wrongful harm to protected interests (ALI 1965, §8). These basic 
definitions suggest that to know the nature of the entitlement created by tort protection, one 
needs to know 1) which interests are protected, 2) what interference is proscribed, and 3) what 
remedy will be provided if wrongful interference has harmed a protected interest. The incidence 
of the property rights created, defined, and enforced by torts is defined by these three elements. 
Protected interests. The Restatement of Torts Second uses the term “interest” to denote 
an object of human desire (ALI 1977, §1). These interests range from interests in physical 
security and autonomy in the enjoyment of one’s physical property or person, to interests “in 
emotional security and other intangible interests such as privacy,” to interests “in economic 
security and opportunity” (Dobbs 2000, 3).  Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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Tort law recognizes a variety of protected interests. From a formal modeling perspective, 
these can be thought of as bundles of tangible and intangible “goods.” The most commonly 
protected interest can be thought of as a party’s interest in the preinjury bundle of goods. If a 
drunk driver happens to crash into a garden wall, the garden’s owner has reasonable assurance 
that the driver can be held liable for restoring the wall to its preinjury condition. In some 
circumstances, a party may have had not the actual enjoyment of the property prior to injury, but 
only the expectation of its future enjoyment. For example, in the case of tortious interference 
with contracts, tort law recognizes an interest in monetary expectations from the contract (ALI 
1977, §911). In recent years, courts have heard arguments that individuals who have increased 
cancer risk due to exposure to a hazardous substance should be able to recover for the disutility 
caused by this increased risk (Cepelewicz and Wiechmann 1995). Were a court to recognize such 
an interest, it could be thought of as the victim’s expected utility defined over potential states of 
health.1 However, not all “interests” are “protected interests.“ In many instances, tort law does 
not recognize an object of human desire as a protected property interest. For example, in many 
jurisdictions a building owner has no protected interest to a view or to light unobstructed by a 
neighboring building, even though these features may constitute a significant portion of the 
property’s market value (Miller and Starr 1989, §15.10). As the Restatement (ALI 1977, §1) puts 
it, 
If society recognizes a desire as so far legitimate as to make one who interferes 
with its realization civilly liable, the interest is given legal protection, generally 
against all the world, so that everyone is under a duty not to invade the interest by 
interfering with the realization of the desire. 
Formally, an interest that is not protected can be thought of as a “protected” interest in the bundle 
of goods in their condition after the interference or harm. 
Duty or proscribed interference. Even legally protected interests are not protected 
against all harm. Basic elements in the victim’s case in a tort suit are to show that the 
                                                 
1 Both here and in discussing torts’ “make whole” rule of compensation, one is forced to ask whether the law looks 
at the subjective evaluations of the individual victim or a “representative” victim. The role of the jury in deciding 
not only the reasonableness of defendants’ behavior in negligence cases, but also whether a particular interest is 
protected and whether damage awards are reasonable, suggests that what is in play is a community standard or 
evaluation of the victim’s position rather than purely the victim’s own subjective evaluation (Harper et al. 1986, 
§15.5 n. 10; Hetcher 2003). For simplicity of presentation, we will speak of the victim’s utility. However, the 
modeling is perhaps better thought of as a representative consumer’s utility, or more accurately, a jury’s evaluation 
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defendant’s action was the legal (or proximate) cause of the victim’s harm and that that action 
was a breach of the defendant’s duty to the victim. That is, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant harmed her by failing to meet the applicable standard of care (Keeton et al. 1988). The 
law and economics literature has contributed substantially to our understanding of the efficiency 
implications of alternative standards of care (see Shavell 1987; Miceli 1997). We take the choice 
of a standard as given and examine how it helps define property rights. For simplicity, we focus 
on the following three standards: simple negligence, strict liability, and no liability. The 
implications of more complex tort standards are left for future research.  
Remedy. The nature of the remedy for abrogation of rights largely determines the 
practical meaning of a right. The standard tort remedy is monetary compensation (Keeton et al. 
1988).2 In general, courts hold that “the purpose of compensatory damages is to make the 
plaintiff whole—that is, to compensate the plaintiff for the damage that the plaintiff has 
suffered” (5th Circuit 1998, 170); or, stated differently, “torts seeks to put the victim in the 
position he was before the tort.“3 Juries are typically instructed that “the object of an award of 
damages is to place the plaintiff, as far as money can do it, in the situation he/she would have 
occupied if the wrong had not been committed” (Eades 1998, 3).4  
These statements correspond very closely to the conventional economic concept of the 
Hicksian compensating variation as a measure of the change in a consumer’s welfare. The 
compensating variation is the monetary compensation made after a change has occurred that 
                                                 
2 Depending on the circumstances, courts may also grant equitable relief in the form of an injunction or restitution 
(Keeton et al. 1988). 
3 Blackburn citing Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. 1880 (as cited in Markesinis and Deakon (1994, 691), 
Restatement of Torts 2d 1977, §901). 
4 Here and elsewhere in this section, we make reference to jury instructions as collected and codified in hornbooks 
such as Eades (1998) and ABA (1996) because jury instructions create the expectations on which legal professionals 
(judges, attorneys) rely, and they effectively characterize the law for the jury as decisionmaker. Note that although 
the question of which interests are protected is primarily a matter of law for the court to determine, the assessment of 
damage awards is almost wholly the province of the jury (Eades 1998, 3, citing Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, 
Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 742 P.2d 377 (1987); C.N. Brown Co. v. Gillen, 569 A2d 1206 (Me. 1990); Nord v. Shoreline 
Sav. Ass’n, 57 Wash. App. 151, 787 P2d 66 (1990)). Efforts by judges to direct the jury to make a specific damage 
award, with the exception of statutory remedies such as disgorgement of profits or other restitutionary remedies, are 
typically overturned as being outside the court’s power (see, e.g., Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 GA 708, 242 S.E. 
2d (1978)). Of course the jury’s discretion is not without limits. The award cannot be arbitrary or without basis in 
evidence. Like other aspects of the trial, a jury’s assessment of damages is reviewable by higher courts and can be 
voided for being either substantially higher or lower than the range of damages established by evidence (Neyer v. 
U.S., 845 F2d 641 (6th Cir. 1988); Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d (Pa. 1994)). Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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returns an economic agent to the utility level associated with a reference vector of goods that 
characterizes the prechange condition. In the tort setting, the reference vector of goods would be 
the bundle represented by the victim’s protected interests. However, there are some important 
differences between the legal and economic conceptualizations of this protected interest. In tort, 
the jury instructions clearly indicate that 1) it is not the victim’s evaluation of the change in her 
own utility that defines her protected interest and determines her compensation, it is a 
community evaluation of the change in her utility formed by the jury; and 2) it is not always her 
actual preinjury bundle of goods that counts, but rather her preinjury expectations.  
For example, the most basic instruction regarding tort damages is that if the jury finds the 
defendant liable, they are to determine the amount of compensatory damages that would “fairly 
and fully” compensate the injured plaintiff (Eades 1998, 8). Jurors are not allowed to follow the 
“golden rule” of placing themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and granting the damages that they 
would wish if they themselves were the plaintiff; judgments can be voided if the judge’s 
instructions permit jurors to do this (96 ALR 760–764 (1964)).5 This is a corollary of the more 
general rule that the jury is to be instructed to avoid sympathizing with either party and to base 
their award on a dispassionate, fair assessment of the plaintiff’s harm.6 At the same time, juries 
are also admonished to award damages that are “fair compensation for all of the plaintiff’s 
damages, no more and no less” (5th Circuit 1998, 170, emphasis added). In doing so, the jury is 
                                                 
5 This is a very long-standing rule. “In Paschall v. Williams (1826) 11 NC (4 Hawks) 292, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina criticized an instruction as to damages in an assault and battery case: if the jury were to imagine 
themselves placed in a similar situation with the plaintiff, what sum would they think sufficient to compensate them 
for such an injury;…by giving the plaintiff what they would be willing to take” (96 ALR 2d at 763 (1964)). 
6 “The damages that you award must be fair compensation for all the plaintiff’s damages, no more and no less.…If 
you decide to award compensatory damages, you should be guided by dispassionate common sense,” (5th Circuit 
1998 at 170). “In determining damages,…you must not allow yourselves to be influenced by passion, prejudice, or 
sympathy for one side or the other. You must base your award solely on a fair and impartial consideration of all the 
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“to apply to the facts in evidence that common knowledge and experience in life which men 
generally possess” (Bates v. Friedman (MoApp), 7 SW2d 452). 7  
Taken together, what is to be made of these rules? The prohibition on “golden rule” 
instructions is a clear statement that the jury is not to measure the victim’s loss from the victim’s 
subjective perspective. The admonition against sympathizing with the plaintiff is a rule against 
unconstrained maximization of the plaintiff’s utility. Similarly, the requirement that the victim be 
fully compensated if liability is found rules against maximizing the defendant’s utility. Thus the 
admonition against sympathy, coupled with the structure of the full compensation requirement 
and the explicit prohibition on assessing the damage award as what is desirable from the victim’s 
own perspective, imposes a discipline on awards by requiring the jury to look evenhandedly at 
both the plaintiff and the defendant. The emphasis on fairness and on the jury bringing common 
knowledge and life experience to bear in assessing damages suggests that the jury is to apply an 
objective standard.8 
As in the case of assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in negligence 
cases, there is a dynamic efficiency logic to these instructions for the determination of 
compensatory damages. The jury is intended to bring to bear experience with community 
expectations, both about reasonableness of behavior and fairness of compensation. Since both the 
injured and the injurer are presumed to live with that same general set of community 
expectations, they have general knowledge, in advance, of the care that is expected of them and 
the protection they can expect. It is this knowledge that helps settle expectations about the 
                                                 
7 Similarly, in a Michigan instruction, jurors were reminded that the purpose of compensatory damages is “limited 
to the amount of damages which the evidence reasonably satisfies the jury the plaintiff has sustained”: “[the amount 
of damages] is left entirely to the sound judgment and discretion of the jurors.… [In determining damage awards] 
you are supposed to use the same common sense and judgment about what he ought to have as you would in passing 
upon matters of equal importance, the only limit being that it shall be full and fair compensation for the injuries 
shown to have been sustained under the testimony in the case” (Wilton v. Flint, 128 Mich 156, 87 NW 86, emphasis 
added). An Oklahoma jury in a business tort was instructed that “it is not necessary that any witness should have 
expressed an opinion as to the amount of such damage, but the jury may themselves make such estimate from the 
facts and circumstances in proof and by considering them in connection with their knowledge, observation, and 
experience in business affairs of life (Muskogee Elec. Trac. Co. v. Mueller, 39 Okl 63, 134 P 51, emphasis added). 
8 This is consonant with instructions on tort rules that hold that the defendant must “take their victim as they find 
them.” For example, in assessing loss of future earnings, the jury is to consider what the plaintiff might reasonably 
have expected to earn, “given his health, education, opportunity for education, age, intelligence, industriousness” 
(Harper et al. 1986, sec. 25.8 nn. 4–6, emphasis added). It is not the victim’s subjective assessment of her own 
position, but rather the jury’s “fair,” “impartial,” “dispassionate,” “commonsense” assessment of the change in 
position of a person with the victim’s characteristics who has suffered as the victim has. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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meaning of property ownership in the face of accidents and other unintentional harm (Dobbs 
2000). In economic terms, the utility function that is employed for assessing the Hicksian 
compensating variation is something akin to that of a representative consumer. It is a 
representative individual from the jury’s community who matches the objective position of the 
particular victim who has suffered this particular injury. 
This is not to make light of the difficulty of measuring the compensating variation, which 
is often a difficult task for the jury. Even in the case of pure financial loss—as, for example, in 
awarding damages for tortious breach of contract—there can be significant uncertainty. This is a 
difficulty that courts explicitly recognize in both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages cases.9 
For example, in a conventional business tort setting, a jury will be instructed to take into 
consideration “uncertainties and contingencies by which [past profits and losses] probably would 
have been affected,…[as well as] future uncertainties such as increase [sic] competition, 
increased operating costs, and changes in economic trends” (ABA 1998, 99).  
2  A Formal Model of Tort Law’s Protection of Legally Recognized Interests 
In this section, we present a formal economic model that represents the functioning of 
tort law as described in the previous section. The interests protected by tort law can be 
represented as a bundle of market and nonmarket goods, denoted x and q, respectively. The 
market goods can be freely purchased at prices denoted by the vector p. The nonmarket goods 
cannot be purchased and their availability is fixed as far as the individual is concerned (i.e., taken 
by her as exogenous).10 Given the individual’s monetary wealth, denoted w, she is free to choose 
the bundle of market goods that gives her the maximum possible satisfaction subject to her 
budget constraint. The well-being she attains when confronted with prices, p, and endowed with 
wealth, w, and health, q, is denoted v(p,w,q).11 In the absence of an accident or injury, the 
                                                 
9 “The difficulty or uncertainty in ascertaining or measuring the precise amount of any damages does not preclude 
recovery, and you, the jury, should use your best judgment in determining the amount of such damages, if any, 
based upon the evidence” (ABA 1998, 100). “If you should determine the wrong involved in this action to be of 
such a nature as to make it impossible to arrive at an exact figure that will reflect plaintiff’s damages, you may 
award a sum which you can reasonably infer to reflect, roughly, compensation for the wrong” (Eades 1998, 16). 
10 Note that although we treat q as a scalar for simplicity, it could also be a vector.  
11 Following the discussion above, this utility function is taken to be that of a representative individual in the 
community who matches the victim’s objective characteristics and circumstances, rather than her own idiosyncratic 
utility function. Note that since market prices do not play a significant role in the analysis that follows, to simplify 
the notation we will suppress prices and write the indirect utility function as v(w,q). Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
8 
victim’s position consists of a bundle of pecuniary and nonpecuniary outcomes, wn, and qn, and 
without loss of generality, her utility in this condition can be denoted v(wn , qn). In the event of an 
accident or injury, her position is denoted (wa, qa), where wa < wn and qa < qn. If wa < wn, there is 
a pecuniary loss; if qa < qn, there is a nonpecuniary loss. In this condition, her utility is v(wa, qa).  
We consider three alternative sets of interests. One possibility is that the victim’s interest 
is not recognized by the law; in that case, the victim could be said to have a protected interest in 
whatever condition she experiences after an otherwise tortious injury—that is, a protected 
interest in (wa, qa). The polar opposite case is when the victim has a protected interest in her 
uninjured (i.e., preinjury) condition; that is, she has a protected interest in (wn, qn). The third 
possibility is that she has a protected interest in an expectation over states with and without 
injury.  
To model this expectation, we introduce π, the probability that the harm will occur.12 
Harm may result from another’s actions, or it may be caused by things beyond anyone’s control, 
as is the case with natural seepage of oil into coastal waters. In either case, the probability of 
harm is affected by the degree of care exercised by potential injurers, r. In tort cases, courts set a 
level of socially acceptable care, here denoted r, either explicitly as in negligence cases or 
implicitly as in strict liability and no-liability cases. Since the standard of care varies for different 
types of torts, so too does the victim’s expected level of protection. For simplicity, we consider 
three alternative tort rules: no liability, negligence, and strict liability. The risk of harm to 
potential victims is denoted  ()( ) , NL N rr ππ , and  ( ) SL r π . Shavell (1987) showed that where only 
the injurer is able to take precaution, the probability of harm decreases with the stringency of the 
standard of care,  () () () SL N NL r r r π π π ≥ > .13 In real life, the idealized conditions that would lead 
everyone always to take exactly the social standard of care will never exist. Judges make errors 
in setting standards of care. Potential injurers have imperfect knowledge of the costs and 
expected consequences of taking care. Litigation is costly both financially and in terms of time. 
So the actual care that is taken is r % , not r, and the actual risk that potential victims face is 
                                                 
12 As with the utility function, the expectation represented by π is not the victim’s idiosyncratic expectation but 
rather that of a representative member of her community who matches her objective characteristics and 
circumstances. 
13 Proof provided in Appendix I. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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() r π % .14 Since victims base their behavioral decisions on the actual risk they face, their expected 
utility is V(π() r % ) ≡  () r π % v(wa,qa) + (1- ( ) r π % )v(wn,qn).15 In contrast, the expectation protected by 
tort law is V(π( r )) ≡ π( r )v(wa,qa) + (1-π( r ))v(wn,qn). The standard of care also affects the 
actual level of care taken. The actual likelihood of harm also decreases with the stringency of the 
standard of care, so again,  () ( ) ( ) NL N SL rr r ππ π ≥≥ %% % . Thus, both the socially “reasonable” 
likelihood of harm,  () r π , and the actual probability of loss,  ( ) r π % , vary with the standard of 
care.  
2.1 Remedies Implied by Recognized Interests 
As noted above, the monetary damages afforded by tort compensation correspond to the 
Hicksian concept of compensating variation, hereafter denoted C. These damages vary with the 
protected interest and also with the required standard of care. If a victim has a protected interest 
in her preinjury bundle, (wn, qn), the compensation required to protect this interest is C
n > 0 such 
that  
  ( ) () n n a
n
a q w v q C w v , , = + . (1) 
In this case, C
n is independent of both the socially required standard of care, r , and the 
actual level of care, r % .16 When the loss is purely pecuniary, so that wa < wn but qa = qn, C
n = wn - 
wa; thus, for the loss of a market good, C
n amounts to the market value of the good in its 
preinjury condition.17 In contrast, if the victim’s interest is not recognized, (wa,qa), no 
compensation is due, since only C
a = 0 satisfies  
  ( ) () a a a
a
a q w v q C w v , ,   = +    (2) 
                                                 
14 Note that r %  is not the level of care that defines their protected interest. Rather, they are protected against actions 
that do not meet the socially required standard of care, r . As a result, a property interest in one’s expectations is 
defined in terms of  () r π , not  () r π % .  
15 We are assuming that the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms hold. This is a conventional specification of 
preferences and allows for the possibility of loss aversion. The basic structure of our argument would carry through 
for nonexpected utility as well.  
16 The results on the relative magnitudes of alternative compensation levels are proved in Appendixes II and III. 
17 This will not be the case if the injured is loss-averse or exhibits other violations of the expected utility model. 
How this relates to jury assessment of damages is an open question. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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regardless of r  and r % . In the case of a protected interest in one’s expectation, the compensation, 
E
SoC C  is such that 
 
() () ( ) () (, ) ( 1) ( , ) ( , ) ( 1 ) ( , )
E
SoC a SoC a SoC n n a a n n r v w C qr v w q r v w qr v w q ππ π π ++ − = + − %% (3) 
where the subscript SoC denotes the respective standard of care, namely strict liability (SL), 
negligence (N), or no liability (NL), and the superscript denotes the protected interest, in this 
case an expectation. Here, even though the harm is to one’s expectation, the compensation is 
made ex post, since tort law compensates only damage that has occurred.18 Therefore, 
compensation is paid only in the state of loss,  ( ) a
E
a q C w v , + . Dharmapala and Hoffmann (2005) 
show that there is some positive probability of injurers’ violating the negligence standard, even 
with perfect information and no error. In real life we see injurers regularly being held liable 
under a negligence standards. Therefore, both theoretically and empirically, it is reasonable to 
assume that there is some likelihood that a victim’s injury will be caused by negligent behavior. 
A negligence standard implies compensation 
E
N C  such that the victim is indifferent between 
having expected utility based on the social standard of care N r  and having expected utility 
implied by actual behavior, r % N : 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




Na N a N n n
Na a N n n
rv w Cq r v w q







In strict liability cases, the tort law protects an “expectation” that the victim’s interest in 
her preinjury bundle of goods will be protected no matter the level of precaution taken; thus,  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) n n n n SL a
E
SL a SL h w v h w v r h C w v r , , ~ 1 , ~ = − + + π π . (5) 
In cases in which no duty of care is owed, and therefore no liability exists, tort law 
“protects” the victim’s actual expectations; hence 
E
NL C  = 0, since this satisfies 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () () ( ) . , 1 ,
, ~ 1 , ~  
n n NL a a NL
n n NL a
E
NL a NL
h w v r h w v r






                                                 
18 One of the elements of the plaintiff’s case is to prove that she has suffered damage. Only under extraordinary 
circumstances will a court grant ex ante relief. And then, the ex ante relief is always in the form of an injunction and 
never in the form of money damages. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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Table 1 summarizes these compensation rules, and Table 2 characterizes the levels of 
expected utility corresponding to interests created and protected by each rule. 
2.2 Property Rights, Damage Awards, and Initial Endowments  
A few generalizations can be made about the relationship between the magnitude of tort 
damage awards and the property rights presented in Table 1. First, damage awards vary with 
property rights in two ways. They vary with the extent of the interest recognized by tort law, and 
they vary with the standard of care that defines the level of expected interference that the holder 
of the interest must tolerate without protection of law. Second, damage awards in cases where 
there is no duty of care are indistinguishable from those in which there is no interest recognized 
by law. It is observationally equivalent to say that the law does not recognize an interest and to 
say that it does not protect it. From a conceptual perspective, it is useful to maintain the 
distinction between these two cases.19 Third, since compensating variation differs across 
protected interests, so do damage awards. In short, the nature of the property right determines the 
damage award.20 
Proposition 1. Tort damage awards are increasing in the extent of the interest protected 









a D D D D D D = ≤ ≤ = = =    0 .   (7) 
The value of each property right to its holder can be ranked by the utility its holder 
derives from the initial endowment it defines. In an environment of uncertainty, the value of each 
property right also turns on its holder’s expectation of both the likelihood of harm and the 
likelihood that this harm will be remedied. Because there is some possibility that the harm is 
caused by events outside human control or by nontortious human action, there is some possibility 
that even with perfect enforcement, the harm will not have a tort remedy. Let γ denote the 
probability of having an injury remedied under tort law, given that an injury has occurred. We 
assume for simplicity both that there is no uncertainty related to litigation and that litigation is 
costless. The interest holder’s expected utility of her property right is then 
                                                 
19 For example, for many years courts refused to recognize that victims had a compensable interest in the emotional 
distress associated with tortious acts. Courts did not talk about this in terms of injurers’ not having a duty to avoid 
unreasonable infliction of emotional distress, but rather by saying that the measure of these damages was too 
uncertain for the court to be willing to recognize the interest (Keeton et al. 1984, 55). 
20 Proofs of propositions are given in Appendix IV. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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()( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) n n SoC a a SoC a
PI
SoC a SoC SoC SoC q w v q w v q D w v V , 1    , 1   , q w, , π π γ γπ π − + − + + = . (8) 
Under strict liability, γ = 1 and expected utility is just 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) n n SL a
PI
SL a SL SL SL q w v q D w v V , 1      , q w, , π π π − + + = .   (9) 
With no liability or “no duty of care,” γ = 0 and expected utility 
is () ( ) ( ) ( ) n n NL a a NL NL NL q w v q w v V , 1    , q w, , π π π − + = .   (10) 
But under negligence, γ may vary from 0 to 1 and expected utility is 
()( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) n n N a a N a
PI
N a N N N q w v q w v q D w v V , 1    , 1   , q w, , π π γ γπ π − + − + + = .   (11) 
It follows, therefore, that the expected utility from any particular protected interest 
increases with the degree of protection that the protected interest is given. It also follows that 
because tort damage awards increase with the extent of the protected interest, so does the interest 
holder’s expected utility of the property right protected by tort law. Based on the ranking of 
damage awards and Shavell’s finding that the likelihood of harm decreases with the stringency of 
the standard of care, one can rank the value, in terms of the interest holder’s expected utility, of 
alternative property rights, defined and protected by tort law.21 
Proposition 2. The value, in expected utility terms, of property rights defined and 
protected by tort law increases with the stringency of the social standard of care and the extent of 









a V V V V V V = ≤ ≤ ≤ = .   (12) 
In short, the greater the interest protected by a property right and the more protection it is 
granted, the more it is worth in terms of expected utility (see Table 2). This applies as much to 
the right to enjoy use of one’s legally recognized interests free of tortious interference by others 
as it does to other incidences of property ownership: the rights to possess, to transfer, to manage, 
or to reap income from one’s property or protected interests, among others (Honoré 1961). 
                                                 
21 Proofs are provided in Appendix V. 
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3 An Application: Insurance Demand and Products Liability 
What we have shown so far is that different standards of care and different protected 
interests in tort law lead to 1) different levels of well-being for consumers, and 2) different 
amounts of damages. Next, we show that these differences will also affect a consumer’s 
economic behavior, including a consumer’s decision to purchase insurance.  
Interest in the relationship between torts and insurance dates back at least to the 1950s 
discussions about product liability reform (Ehrenzweig 1951; James 1957; P. Keeton 1959; R. 
Keeton 1959; Morris 1952). More recently, a proposal has been put forward to use insurance 
demand as a measure of tort damages in tort cases involving a preexisting contractual 
relationship between the parties (Danzon 1984, Calfee and Rubin 1992). Oi (1973) noted that 
strict product liability effectively creates a forced tied sale of product with “insurance” because 
the product price would include a premium to cover the injurer’s expected tort loss. Danzon 
(1984) argued that it would be a distortion of this market to provide injured parties with 
compensation greater than the insurance they would buy if they were offered insurance with the 
loading on the injurer’s liability insurance. Calfee and Rubin (1992), drawing on work by Cook 
and Graham (1977) and Viscusi and Evans (1990), argued that this measure of damages implies 
that in cases where there is a preexisting contract, nonpecuniary loss should not be compensated 
because people would usually not insure these losses if offered actuarially fair insurance. They 
noted that further research was needed to determine whether this same reasoning would apply to 
torts where there was no preexisting contract. We are aware of no studies that have presented this 
analysis. Viscusi (2000) applies Calfee and Rubin’s (1992) conclusion to the assessment of 
compensation to Kuwaitis for injuries they sustained when Kuwait was invaded by Saddam 
Hussein prior to the first Gulf War, but without the further analysis needed to ensure that this 
extension is appropriate.  
In the following section, we first consider how tort law affects consumers’ decisions to 
cover pecuniary loss, and then discuss how it affects their decisions to cover nonpecuniary loss. 
Many of the results we discuss are old. But we show how an understanding of the ways in which 
alternative tort rules define and protect legally recognized interests affect consumers’ 
expectations—and therefore behavior—supplements existing analysis to provide a more 
complete understanding of the likely effect of proposals for reform in tort rules.  
Insurance demand for pecuniary loss. Consider a purely monetary loss under three of 
the property rights described in Section 2 above: an interest in the preinjury bundle, wn protected 
by no duty of care, strict liability, or the due care standard of negligence. A purely monetary loss Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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can be represented by the change from (wn) to (wa), where loss is L = wn - wa. With an interest in 
(wn) protected by no duty of care, and probability of loss, πNL, the expected utility of the holder of 
this interest is  () ( ) ( ) ( ) n NL a NL n a NL NL w u w u w w V π π π − + = 1 , , . A rational, risk-averse party will 
choose to insure the proportion η of total loss L that maximizes expected utility of loss, given 
insurance: 
[] () ( ) ( ) P w u L P L w u V n NL n NL NL η π η η π η − − + + − − = 1 ,   (13) 
where P is the insurance premium for full coverage. With actuarially fair insurance, πNLL = P, the 
first-order condition, 
() ( ) L w u L L L w u NL n NL n ηπ η π η − ′ = + − − ′ ,   (14) 
will be satisfied when η = 1. Thus, where the property right is to an interest in (wn) “protected” 
by no duty of care, and loss is purely monetary, a rational, risk-averse individual offered 
actuarially fair insurance will fully insure (Mossin 1968).  
There are three senses in which this optimum constitutes full insurance. First, it is full 
insurance in the sense that the amount of coverage purchased exactly offsets the loss,  L L = η . 
Second, it is full insurance in the sense that net wealth is equalized across states of the world 




a w w = . With insurance, the individual’s net income in the state of loss 
can be denoted 
I
a w , and her net income in the state with no loss can be denoted 
I
n w . In the above 
model,  L L L w w NL n
I
a η π η + − − =  and  L w w NL n
I
n π η − = . It follows from equation (14) that 




a w w = . Third, it is full insurance in the sense that with 
this insurance, utility levels are equalized across states of the world; the individual is now 








a U w v w v U = = = . It should be emphasized, however, 
that this optimum does not return the insured party to her initial wealth or utility level. Although 
the purchased coverage will be the full loss,  a n w w L − = , a premium must always be paid, and 
insured wealth will always be less than initial wealth,  P w w n
I − = . Utility with even full 
insurance is, therefore, always less than the insured’s initial utility,  () ( )
o
n n
I U w v P w v U = < − = . 
Full insurance is not full compensation of a monetary loss. 
On the other hand, if the property right is to an interest in (wn) protected by strict liability, 
the same individual offered actuarially fair insurance for a purely monetary loss will not fully 
insure. In the event that there is no loss, she will have (wn). In the event that there is a loss, she 
knows that she will receive compensation C
n that suffices to restore her income to (wn). Her 
expected utility, therefore, is  () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) n n SL n SL n a SL SL w u w u w u w w V = − + = π π π 1 . , . She faces no Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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uncertainty, and she has no reason to purchase insurance, even if it is actuarially fair. This can be 
seen from the individual’s insurance problem: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) L w v L L w v V SL n SL SL n SL SL ηπ π η ηπ π η
η
− − + + − = 1      max . (15) 
Optimal insurance must satisfy the first-order condition 
 
() ( ) L w v L L w v SL n SL a ηπ η ηπ − ′ = + − ′     ,  (16) 
which holds only when η = 0. That is, the individual will purchase no insurance. 
If the property right to an interest in (wn) is protected by the due care standard of 
negligence, the demand for insurance of a purely monetary loss will be still different. The 
potential victim’s expected utility is then 
()() ( ) ( )
() ( ) , 1   
  1   h w, ,
L w v




N n N N N
ηπ π
ηπ π γ η ηπ γπ π
− − +
+ − − − + + + − − =
 (17) 
where γ is the likelihood of being compensated for damage caused by the harm. Optimal 
insurance must satisfy the first-order condition, 






a w v w v C w v ′ = ′ − + + ′     1 γ γ , (18) 








a w v C w v ′ ≠ + ′  ,  the 
rational, risk-averse individual will purchase actuarially fair insurance against a monetary loss,  
L = wn - wa, but will not fully insure. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first is that even for purely 
monetary losses, property rights determine the demand for insurance.22 This result should not be 
surprising. It is a simple application of the general theorem that competitive equilibria are 
continuous functions of initial endowments (Negishi 1972). The second conclusion is that with 
the risk of a monetary loss, the demand for insurance varies inversely with the compensation to 
which the victim is entitled. If there is no duty of care, there is no entitlement to compensation 
and the potential victim fully insures when offered actuarially fair insurance; with strict liability, 
the victim is entitled to full compensation and she chooses no insurance. Both the level of 
compensation and the purchase of insurance are functions of property rights defined by tort law. 
                                                 
22 Proofs are provided in Appendix VII. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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They are inversely related precisely because the extent of property protection offered by tort law 
defines the risk of loss against which an individual may wish to insure.  
Before concluding the discussion of torts involving a purely monetary outcome, it is 
useful to revisit the assumption of actuarially fair insurance. In real-world insurance markets, 
there are generally administrative costs associated with the issuance and administration of the 
insurance that raise the price of insurance above the actuarially fair premium. In a competitive 
insurance market, the insurance premium, P, will be set equal to the expected value of the loss, 
E[L], plus the variable cost of administering the insurance, or loading, c; that is, P=E[L]+c. A 
rational, risk-averse individual with a property interest in (wn) protected by a no duty of care 
standard, who faces the risk of purely monetary loss and is offered insurance priced with a 
loading factor of c, will insure to 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) c L w v L c L L w v V NL n NL NL n NL NL + − − + + + − − = π η π η π η π η
η
1 max .  (19) 
Optimal insurance demand must satisfy 
() () ( ) ( ) c L w v c L c L L w v NL n NL n + − ′ = + + − − ′ π η η π η . (20) 
If the individual were to fully insure, η = 1, this condition would hold with inequality. 
Faced with an insurance premium that includes a loading factor to cover administrative costs, a 
rational consumer would not fully insure. 
As Danzon noted in 1984, this result is of particular importance under a view of tort law 
as compulsory insurance administered through the tort system. If compulsory insurance is 
administered through the tort system, the implied insurance premium must contain a substantial 
loading factor, since the loading factor reflects the cost of administering the insurance policy. 
The cost of administering an “insurance” system through torts claims is the cost of litigation and 
the cost of maintaining a judicial system. Thus, in very few cases would a rational individual 
fully insure even a monetary loss. This implies that if the insurance demanded were used as the 
measure of tort compensation, an investor who brings a civil action to recover damages from 
being defrauded by a stockbroker likely would be unable to recover her full monetary loss. 
Similarly, the damage award to a company that has lost substantial profit because an input 
supplier provided a defective product critical to its manufacturing process would be something 
less than actual financial losses. 
Risk attitudes also influence insurance demand. In the above examples, we have assumed 
that the victim is risk averse. Risk-averse individuals will fully insure against monetary losses if 
offered actuarially fair insurance but will buy less than full coverage if the premium includes Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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loading. Moreover, if absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, as suggested by Arrow 
(1971), then insurance demand decreases with wealth (Mossin 1968). The logical implication of 
measuring tort compensation by insurance demand is that wealthier victims should be 
compensated less than poorer victims for the same monetary loss. This is at odds with torts 
rulings that bar consideration of plaintiff’s wealth in determining compensatory damage 
awards.23 
Insurance demand for nonpecuniary loss. As described above, nonpecuniary losses can 
be modeled using state-dependent or bivariate utility functions, v(w,q), with the loss described by 
changes in the level of q. So an accident that damages only a nonmarket good would lower the 
injured party’s utility from v(w, qn) to v(w, qa). An accident could also entail a monetary loss, 
such that the change is from (wn, qn) to (wa, qa). There is one special case, which will be 
important to our discussion, in which the distinction between bivariate and univariate utility is 
effectively eliminated. This is the case where money wealth, w, and the nonpecuniary outcome, 
q, are perfect substitutes, in which case the indirect utility function takes the form 
U = v(w + q).  (21) 
In this case, money is completely fungible with other goods, not just for purchasing 
market commodities, as is always the case, but also in the sense that the individual perceives 
additional money as a perfect substitute for an adverse nonmarket outcome.24 Since everything 
that the individual cares about is reducible to money in this case, (26) is effectively a univariate 
utility function.  
Insurance in this bivariate context is different from insurance in a univariate context. In 
the univariate case, what is lost and what is provided by way of compensation when the loss 
occurs are the same item—money. The compensation is a perfect substitute for the loss, in the 
sense captured by the utility function (26). In the bivariate case, these are two different items: 
what is lost is q and perhaps w, whereas what is potentially available by way of compensation is 
more w, not more q. Unless the bivariate utility function has the structure of (26), the 
compensation is inherently less than a perfect substitute for what was lost. As Cook and Graham 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (2003); and Sielbergleit v. First Interstate Bank, 37 F. 3 
394 (1994) (reversing and remanding earlier verdict for admitting evidence of plaintiff’s wealth as relevant to 
assessment of damages). 
24 Hanemann (1998) discusses this case and shows that perfect substitution between q and one or more market 
commodities in the direct utility function is a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for (18) to hold. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
18 
(1977) noted, this fundamentally changes the nature of the insurance. The conclusion that tort 
compensation of nonpecuniary losses provides unwanted insurance when the tort involves a 
preexisting contractual relationship between the parties relies heavily on this result. Cook and 
Graham characterize the difference in terms of the propensity of rational, risk-averse individuals 
to fully insure against a loss in the case of univariate utility, but less than fully insure in the case 
of bivariate utility. Yet it is not clear that definitions of full insurance developed under a 
univariate utility model apply with bivariate utility. In fact, it is not clear that one can 
meaningfully define what it means to fully insure where utility is bi- or multivariate. Looking to 
the univariate case, full insurance was defined in three ways. The most commonplace concept of 
full insurance was that coverage literally offsets the full loss,  L L = η . This is really an in-kind 
concept of insurance, and it works in the univariate case because the loss and insurance payments 
are made with the same good, w. It does not work in the bivariate case because in this case the 
loss and the compensation involve two different goods, q and w. Alternatively, full insurance 
was defined as insurance coverage that smoothes wealth across states of the world. With 
bivariate utility, the insurance coverage that equalizes wealth across states of the world will be 
optimal insurance if and only if the marginal utility of wealth is independent of the nonpecuniary 
good. In this case, wealth is perfectly smoothed across states of the world where there is a 
bivariate utility and a purely nonpecuniary loss, yet there is no insurance. Finally, full insurance 
coverage was defined as coverage that equalizes postinsurance utility across state of the world. 
This is the definition of full insurance adopted by Cook and Graham (1977). They show that with 
bivariate utility, optimal insurance will equate utility levels across states of the world if and only 
if the utility function has the perfect substitution form of (26); that is, if and only if wealth is a 
perfect substitute for the lost nonpecuniary good. Under Cook and Graham’s definition, people 
will fully insure. But in this case, bivariate utility is effectively univariate utility, so one has not 
really defined full insurance in a way that is meaningful for bi- or multivariate utility. At the very 
least, it is not a definition that is consistent with the definition of full insurance with univariate 
utility.  
Under Cook and Graham’s definition of full insurance, in general, people will not fully 
insure nonpecuniary loss. They will fully insure only as long as monetary wealth and 
nonpecuniary goods are perfect substitutes. That is, they will insure to equate utility across states 
of the world only if the marginal utility of wealth is independent of the level of the nonpecuniary 
good. If the marginal utility of wealth is increasing in loss of the nonpecuniary good, optimal 
insurance will move more wealth to the loss state. If the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing 
in loss of the nonpecuniary good, they will move less wealth to the loss state. Results from Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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Viscusi and Evans (1990) provide evidence to suggest that for most accidents involving personal 
injury, the marginal utility of wealth decreases with the accident. Based on Cook and Graham 
(1977) and Viscusi and Evans (1990), the insurance view of tort compensation concludes that 
most people would demand less than “full” insurance for loss of nonpecuniary goods (in the 
sense of smoothing utility). From this perspective, the existence of less than perfect substitution 
between monetary wealth and nonpecuniary goods can be seen as functioning much like loading. 
Even though loading leads people to less than fully insure monetary loss, courts have not yet 
been willing to see it as a reason to less than fully compensate tort victims for monetary loss.25 
Consistent application of use of insurance demand as a measure of tort compensation would 
require this. 
4 Stability of Property Rights 
In a framework that models how tort law defines incidences of property, the proposal to 
use insurance demand as a measure of tort compensation could be analyzed as a proposal to 
change the property right protected by torts based on efficiency concerns. U.S. courts and 
legislatures have made such changes in the past. The shift in product liability cases from a 
negligence to a strict liability standard in the mid-20th century could be modeled as a change 
from a property right defined as a protected interest in (wa,qa) protected by a negligence rule to a 
property right defined as a protected interest in (wa, qa) protected by a strict liability rule. This 
change was based on the efficiency argument that liability should lie with the least-cost risk 
bearer.  
The proposal to use an insurance demand measure of tort compensation implies a 
property right defined as an interest in (wn,qn) enforced by the level of compensation that would 
be chosen through first-party casualty insurance, given the default protection of no liability. The 
proposed rule sets up a bargaining game between potential victims and the courts. Consider the 
decision process of a rational potential victim. The potential victim knows that if a defendant is 
liable, her compensable loss will be measured in terms of the insurance she would demand in a 
state of the world in which defendants have no liability. Under this rule, the court must set 
compensation equal to the victim’s insurance demand. But the potential victim’s best response, 
                                                 
25 The collateral source rule prohibits juries from considering whether the plaintiff carried insurance when 
determining damage awards (Eades 1998). Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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knowing that the court will set compensation equal to her insurance demand, will be to revise her 
insurance demand accordingly. The court, in response, must revise the compensation granted. 
The victim’s best response to this revision in compensation is to revise her insurance demand 
again. And the cycle goes on.  
Consider the outcome of this Nash game in the case of a purely monetary loss with 
actuarially fair insurance with no loading and a risk-averse victim. The best response of a 
rational, risk-averse potential victim, seeing that her interest in (wn) is protected under no 
liability, will be to demand full insurance. The court must then grant compensation equal to full 
insurance. The potential victim’s best response to courts granting compensation equal to full 
insurance will be to demand no insurance. The court will then set compensation equal to zero, 
the new insurance demand. The process repeats itself ad infinitum. The sequence of damage 
awards for monetary loss can be described by the first-order difference equation 
  L D D t t + − = −1   (22) 
where D0 = L. The solution,  
  () ( ) 2 2 1 0 L L D D
t
t + − − = ,  (23) 
will oscillate forever between the alternative states of compensation equal to full insurance or no 
compensation. There is no stable equilibrium in this game. Tort liability, which presumably 
functions to provide some stability of expectations on which parties can base decisions about 
how to use their assets, will fail to do so. 
If the loss is nonpecuniary, and assuming that the victim’s marginal utility of wealth is 
decreasing in the nonpecuniary good, the victim’s best response to a no-liability rule will be to 
demand less than full insurance. In this case, there will be an equilibrium level of insurance 
demand, but it will not be the initial insurance demand as expected under literature on insurance 
demand as a measure of tort compensation. A potential victim, seeing that her loss of qn due to 
tortious actions will be protected by a no-liability standard, will respond by purchasing 
insurance, but that insurance may be more or less than full insurance. If her marginal utility of 
wealth is unaffected by the nonpecuniary loss, then the game will lead to the same instability 
encountered with monetary loss. If victims’ marginal utility of wealth decreases with 
nonpecuniary loss, as suggested by Cook and Graham (1977) and Viscusi and Evans (1990), the 
picture changes. Potential victims, seeing that their loss of qn will be protected by a no-liability 
rule, will best respond by choosing to carry less than full insurance. The court will set the 
damage award equal to this insurance demand. Potential victims, responding to the court’s Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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response, will see their loss as much smaller but nonzero, and will insure this small loss. Courts 
must respond by setting compensation equal to this reduced insurance demand. Potential victims, 
seeing their revised award, view their loss as slightly less than an uncompensated loss and will 
demand slightly less insurance than in the first round. Here, damage awards will also cycle 
according to a linear difference equation. But instead of being of the form represented by (27), it 
will have the general form 
  () a D n D t t + − = −1 1   (24) 
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same thing would happen with purely monetary loss and a risk-averse victim facing insurance 
with loading (or a tort system with positive administrative costs). Although in equilibrium the 
compensation rule will be stable, the resulting damage rule will not be the insurance demanded 
by an individual facing a loss for which there is no tort liability, D = qL, as is expected in the 
literature on insurance demand as an efficient measure of tort compensation (Calfee and Rubin 
1992; Rubin 1993). Rather, it will be some unknown lower level.  
Finally, consider the case of monetary loss with actuarially fair insurance, no loading, and 
a risk-neutral potential victim. The best response of rational, risk-neutral potential victims, 
seeing that their interest in (wn) is “protected” under a no-liability rule, will be to demand no 
insurance. The court must then award no tort compensation. The court’s judgment not to award 
damages has no influence on the class of risk-neutral potential victims’ desire not to insurance. 
They will continue to demand no insurance. Although this would not be a comfortable result for 
most traditional tort theorists or courts, it is at least a stable rule. Is there a class of risk-neutral 
potential victims? The most likely candidates would be publicly held firms. In fact, the 
willingness of insurance companies to insure provides quite direct evidence of either risk 
neutrality or even a preference for risk. Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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Conclusion 
Property law plays a critical function in a market economy by defining entitlements and 
settling expectations about how these entitlements will be protected. This set of expectations 
determines the value of the property both to its holder and to others in a market. To the extent 
that these expectations are well-defined and expectations about their protection are settled, 
market exchange is enabled. The law of torts plays an important role in completing the property 
rights system by defining the extent to which property is protected from harm. It does this by 
defining the kinds of interests that will be recognized and protected by the courts, as well as by 
defining the duty of care owed these recognized interests by others and the manner in which they 
will be protected through monetary compensation, restitution, or injunction. Together, these 
three elements of torts define a right in the bundle of property rights.  
In this article, we develop a systematic approach to formalizing the nature of the property 
rights protected by tort law. We use this approach to reexamine the literature on compensation 
for nonpecuniary damages. This reexamination demonstrates how recognizing tort’s role in 
defining property rights and having a way of formalizing these rights can provide deeper insight 
into old questions. 
A fairly settled literature argues for use of insurance demand as a measure of 
compensation in torts, such as product liability, that involve a preexisting contractual relationship 
among the parties. In the case of harm to nonpecuniary goods, Calfee and Rubin (1992) argue 
that this compensation rule would result in not compensating damage to nonpecuniary goods in 
torts involving preexisting contracts.  
A desire for parsimony (as well as equity) would seem to suggest that it is desirable to 
apply the same rule to protection of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary property. Use of formal 
analysis of the manner in which tort law defines property rights suggests that we have not yet 
solved the puzzle of finding a satisfactory, consistent compensation rule for both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary loss. More importantly, it shows how use of formal analysis of the property rights 
defined by torts can help provide a more complete understanding of issues we thought were well 
understood in the law and economics literature.  
 Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
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Table 1. Damage Awards under Tort Law 
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Table 2. Ranking of Expected Utility of Property Rights/Initial Endowments  
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Note: Utility levels given equal ranking are equal. 
RI
SoC V  = the expected utility of a property right in recognized interest , RI, protected by standard of care, 
SoC  
r  = due care or level of care required to avoid liability under negligence 
w = (wa, wn) , q = (qa, qn)  
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Appendix I. Ordering of Actual Care Taken under Alternative Property 
Interest/Standard of Care Pairings 
Let 
r = level of precaution taken by tortfeasors 
x = activity level 
π = probability of harm 
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π π  
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c(r) = tortfeasor’s cost of precaution 
 
1.  Following Shavell (1987), for a given recognized interest, the Social Planner’s problem is to 
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This can be interpreted as maximization of total and therefore average net utility. Similarly, 
the tortfeasor’s problem can be interpreted as the problem of a representative or average 
tortfeasor. Potential tortfeasors problem under 
 












ii)  Strict Liability, the tortfeasor’s problem is the same as the social problem; that is, to  
  () r l rx x u
r x
− − ) ( max
, . 
  Therefore, r = r*, and  
  () * * ) ( r l r x u + = ′ , which implies that x = x*. 
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iii)   Negligence, assuming that the cost of taking care increases with the level of care taken, 
and that the court sets due care required to avoid liability under negligence at the socially 
optimal level of care, tortfeasors will take the socially optimal level of care and will not 
be held liable for damages. Therefore, their problem is,  
  given r = r*, to 
 
() ( ) SL N
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x x x r l r r x u
x r x u
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 Shavell  (1987).   
 
2.  Shavell (1987) established that for a given property interest, ( ) n n h w ,,   
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3.  For a recognized interest in() a a q w , , l(r) in Shavell’s model is equal to zero. Therefore, no 
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4.  For recognized interest in, V(π(r), w, q): 
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i) with strict liability, choice of x and r are independent of l(r). Since 
n E
SL C C = , it follows 
that l(r) is the same for V(π,w,q) and v(wn, qn) where both are protected by strict liability. 












SL π π π = = . 
 
ii) with negligence, by the same argument as applied by Shavell in the case of a recognized 
interest in () n q , n w , on average potential tortfeasors will take precaution level r*. Since the 
potential tortfeasor’s optimization problem for negligence is independent of l(r) and therefore 
of 
PI
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Conclusion 
Mean probability of loss is increasing in the protection given the recognized interest and 
independent of the particular recognized interest. That is, 
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Appendix II. Compensation Implied by Alternative Recognized Interests 
In general,  () ( ) interest property    protected interest   damaged    s.t.    C v C v = +  
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Appendix III. Order of Compensation Levels Required to Restore Victims to the 
Utility Level Defined by the Protected Property Interest 
Assume  () () ( ) ( ) 0 q , , 0 q , , q , q , 0 n a n a > ′ < ′ ≤ ≤ n a n a w v w v w v w v , wa < wn , qa < qn, and p is 
exogenously determined. 
    
1.  0 =
a C . Follows directly from defining  ( ) ( ) p ; q , p ; q ,    s.t.    C a a a
a
a
a w v C w v = + . 
1. 2.  0 >
n C . By assumption () p h; w,  v  is increasing in w and h,  n a q q    and    , < < n a w w . As a 
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 By  assumption,  () p ; ,   h w v  is monotonically increasing in w and h. Therefore, inverting, it 
follows that 
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N C ≤ 0 , assuming that courts do not require owners to compensate society 
when the average precaution level leads to  π π    ≤ N . 
 a)  Let  π π   = N , then  0 =
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N C  follows directly from the definition of 
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 b)  Let  π π    > N . Suppose  0 =
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N C . Then  
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  which is a contradiction. Because expected utility is strictly increasing in 
EA
N C , it follows 
that 0 >
EA
N C . 
 
   c) Let  π π    < N  .  Suppose  0 =
EA
N C . Then  
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  which is a contradiction. Because expected utility is strictly increasing in 
EA
N C , it follows 
that 0 <
EA
N C . But in fact, the role of courts in torts actions has been to protect property 
owners against behavior that fails to meet the social standard of care, i.e. against  r rN    ≤ . 
It has not been to force property owners to pay for the privilege of living in a setting in 
which people, on average, act with precaution that exceeds the social standard of care. 
The institutional purpose of torts law constrains 
EA
N C  to be nonnegative.  
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Summary 
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5.   Finally, the above ordering also holds for pure nonmonetary losses (qa;w), for pure monetary 
losses (wa;q), and for mixed losses (wa, qa). 
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Appendix IV. Ordering Damage Payments 
Let 
PI
SoC D  denote the damage award for protected interest, PI, protected by standard of 
care, SoC. 
 
1.  Any “protected” interest and no duty of care implies  0 = NL D . 
 
2. Protected  interest  in  () p ; q , a a w  and any standard of care implies, for all r,  0 =
a D  
 
3.   Protected interest in () p ; q , n n w  and negligence implies, for r>r*, 
n n C D = . 
 
4.   Protected interest in () p ; q , n n w  and strict liability implies, for all r, 
n n C D = . 
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a D D D D D = ≤ ≤ = = 0 , where the ordering follows the ordering of 
PI
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Appendix V. Expected Utility of Property Rights/Initial Endowments 
  In general, expected utility derived from a property right protected by torts is defined as 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) n n SoC a SoC a
PI
SoC a SoC SoC
PI
SoC w v w v D w v V q , 1    q , 1   q , q w, , , a π π γ γπ γ π − + − + + =  
where γ = 0 for no liablity; γ = 1 for strict liability, and 0 < γ < 1 for negligence. 
  
1.  Given a recognized interest in (wa,ha) protected by any standard of care, D
a = 0 for all r, and 
πSoC = πNL. Expected utility is then 
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2.  Given any recognized interest protected by no duty of care, DNL = 0 for all r, and πSoC = πNL. 
Expected utility is then 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) n a q , 1    q , h w, , , n NL a NL NL NL w v w v V π π γ π − + = . 
 
3.   Given a recognized interest in  ( ) ( ) h w, , r V π  protected under negligence, 
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4.  Given a recognized interest in (wn,hn) protected under negligence,  ,    all for     r r C D
n n
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and  N SoC π π = . Expected utility is then 
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5.  Given a recognized interest in ( ) () h w, , r V π  protected under strict liability, 
n E
SL C D =  for all r, 
and * π π = SoC . Expected utility is then  
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6.  Given a recognized interest in (wn,qn) protected under strict liability, 
n n
SL C D =  for all r, 
and * π π = SoC . Expected utility is then 
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Appendix VI. Ranking Expected Utility Property Rights Defined by Torts 
1.   Given expected utility as a function of protected interest and standard of care, where the 
expected utility, 
PI
SoC V , is given as 
(1)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) n n NL a a NL
a q w v q w v V , 1 , π π − + =  
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3.  It follows that 
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iv.  (1) = (2), i.e.  NL
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Appendix VII. Insurance Demand for Nonmonetary Loss as a Function of Property 
Rights 
The insurance problem changes slightly when the loss is purely nonmonetary.  
 
The risk-averse individual’s problem becomes 
(13) () ( ) ( ) ( ) w w w q w v q w v n a n n a a w w a n
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θ π




= + − − + −
= − +
+ − = − =
A
w A w w
w w w





   and        Since
 
 
(1) can be rewritten 
() () ( ) ( )  , 1 , 1 max n a A q A w v q A w v π π π π − − + − +  
 
with corresponding FOC: 
() () ( )   , , 1 max n a A q A w v q A w v π π − ′ = − + ′  
 
If marginal utility of wealth is invariant to the state of the world, then insurance of A=0 is 
optimal. In this case, wn= wa. 
 
If marginal utility of wealth is decreasing in q, as is maintained by Viscusi and Evans 
(1991), then insurance A<0 is optimal. In this case, wn>wa. 
 
If marginal utility of wealth is increasing in q, as might be expected from a Beckerian 
household model with wealth effects swamping substitution effects, then insurance A>0 is 
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Nonmonetary Insurance and Property Rights 
How does insurance of nonmonetary losses vary with property rights? 
 
1.  If the property interest is in (w,qn) or is any property interest protected by a no-liability rule, 
then compensation C =0, and the individual’s problem is (13 ) above with  NL π π = . 
  () () ( ) ( ) n a q , 1    q , A q, w, , , A w v A A w v V V NL NL NL NL
a π π π π γ π − − + + − = =  
 
If the property interest is in expectations protected by negligence, then the risk-averse 
individual’s problem is to 
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3.   If the property interest is in (w,qn) protected by negligence, then the risk-averse individual’s 
problem is to  
 
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ()




q , 1    q , 1 1
  q , q , q , 1
q , 1    q , 1 1
1 A q, w, , , max
A w v A w v
w v v A w v
A w v A w v
C A w v V
N N N N
N N
N N N N
n




π π π π γ
π γπ
π π π π γ
π γπ γ π
− − + − + − +
+ − + =
− − + − + − +




 Resources for the Future  Hoffmann and Hanemann 
40 
 FOC: 
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4.   If the property interest is in (w,qn) protected by strict liability, then the risk-averse 
individual’s problem is to  
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5.   If the property interest is in expectations protected by strict liability, then the risk-averse 
individual’s problem is to 
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  The same as in (2) above. 
 